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Scholars, journalists, and activists working on climate change often distinguish between “individual” and “structural” 
approaches to decarbonization. The former concern choices individuals can make to reduce their “personal carbon 
footprint” (e.g., eating less meat). The latter concern changes to institutions, laws, and other social structures. These two 
approaches are often framed as oppositional, representing a mutually exclusive forced choice between alternative routes 
to decarbonization. After presenting representative samples of this oppositional framing of individual and structural 
approaches in environmental communication, we identify four problems with oppositional thinking and propose five ways 




Scholars, journalists, and activists working on climate change often distinguish between 
“individual” and “structural” approaches to decarbonization. The former concern behaviors and 
consumption choices individual citizens can make to reduce their “personal carbon footprint” (e.g., 
eating less meat). The latter focus instead on institutions that shape collective action, especially state 
and national laws, industrial policies, and international treaties. While the distinction between 
individualism and structuralism—the latter of which we understand broadly to include approaches 
described as “institutional,” “systemic,” and “collectivist”—is intuitive and ubiquitous, the two 
approaches are often portrayed as oppositional, as if one or the other is the superior route to 
decarbonization, and as if pursuing one is somehow antithetical to pursuing the other. 
One form this opposition takes in public discourse is whether individual action “matters,” or 
rather whether it is negligible because what’s “really” important is structural change. Representative 
headlines that allude to this opposition include “You Can’t Save the Climate by Going Vegan” 
(Mann & Brockopp 2019) and “I Work in the Environmental Movement. I Don’t Care if You 
Recycle” (Heglar 2019). Similarly, a popular online meme in 2021 depicted the massive Ever Given 
ship stuck in the Suez Canal (Yee and Glanz 2021) with a comparatively tiny excavator attempting to 
dig it out, in apparent futility. In one tweet (with over 7,400 likes; Mauldin 2021), the Ever Given is 
explicitly compared to a “structural problem” while the excavator is compared to “making different 
personal choices.” In another (with over 2,100 likes; Thaler 2021), the Ever Given is compared to 








Familiar headlines and contrasts like these imply that personal choices are irrelevant to 
addressing the climate crisis, and that the only thing that will move the needle are changes to 
corporate practices, government policies, and other social systems. In his “Weekly Planet” 
newsletter published by The Atlantic, journalist Robinson Meyer explicitly endorses the irrelevance of 
personal behavior relative to system-wide change. Having described the massive decline of 
greenhouse gas emissions in 2020 (due to the pandemic), he concludes, “But that behavioral 
change was not enough to meet even the least ambitious of America’s long-term climate 
goals. This extraordinary and painful trial should provide the final proof, I think, that climate 
change simply cannot be solved by changing our personal behavior. We have to change systems, and 
the only way to do that is to develop and deploy technologies that will enable economic prosperity 
without carbon pollution” (1.12.21). The oppositional view Meyer expresses has captured 
widespread interest. On February 4th, 2021, for example, a piece entitled “How Useful is Recycling, 
Really?” was the second most popular article on The Atlantic’s homepage. 
In this paper, we offer further representative samples of either/or oppositional thinking as it 
arises in scholarly research on climate change. We then identify four problems with the general 
oppositional framing of structural and individual reform. We propose five ways to think 
“symbiotically” instead. Our proposals are based on a synthesis of evidence that draws on research 
in environmental communication (e.g., Scheufele et al. 2004; Norton 2007; Nisbet 2009; Whitmarsh 
et al. 2011; Mitra 2016) as well as a number of other social scientific disciplines (e.g., Madva 2016, 
2017, 2020; Brownstein 2018; Davidson & Kelly 2020; Nielsen et al. 2020; Schmitt et al. 2020). A 
symbiotic conception of structural and individual reform rejects the either/or thinking of the 
oppositional frame and ultimately promotes a “both/and” approach to meeting the climate crisis. 
Instead of debating whether to focus either on personal lifestyle and consumer change or corporate 
and policy change, advocates should instead think in terms of “both/and” packages of changes. 
These will identify which specific individual-level changes in lifestyle, consumption, and activism best 
complement those specific structural transformations to economies and political systems that will 
combat climate change, and vice versa. In sum, for every structural reform to prioritize, there are 
certain individual reforms to prioritize because they contribute to achieving that structural reform. 
And for each individual reform to prioritize, there are particular structural reforms to put in place 
because they incentivize, nudge, convince, or enable individuals to make the prescribed behavioral 
changes. Individuals and structures are interdependent and mutually supporting. Our argument aims 
to show that continued attention to the features of both—as well as the interactions between 
them—is necessary for meaningful action on climate change. We conclude with directions for 
further research to better understand the effects of oppositional vs. symbiotic frames, with an eye 
toward identifying communication strategies better suited to meet the climate crisis. 
 
2. Individualism and Structuralism in Climate Politics and Activism 
The current debate over action on climate change is a specific instance of a more general 
dialectic that has a long and rich history. Indeed, “the” dispute between individualists and 
structuralists is not actually a single disagreement but a family of thematically related debates. These 
include social scientific debates about the relative influence of individual agency versus structural 
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factors in driving historical change (Sewell 2005), political debates pitting libertarians and liberal 
individualists against socialists and communitarians (Bird 1999; Bell 2020), and methodological 
debates about suitable explanations of social behavior (Dumont 1986; Giddens 1986; Elster 1989; 
Haslanger 2015). Concepts and assumptions from many of these literatures inform two long-
standing streams of research and activism on environmental protection, sustainability, and 
decarbonization. For a schematic attempt to capture the leading “sides” and “arguments” as they 
appear in American public discussion of climate change, see Table 1.  
While we believe that symbiotic thinking about how individuals shape and are shaped by 
systems and cultures can be usefully applied across different cultures (e.g., Markus and Kitayama 
2010), this essay is focused on English-speaking, particularly American, climate change discourse. 
Individualism has been particularly salient in American history and culture, and has taken many 
forms—perhaps mostly recognizably in “the myth of rugged individualism” (Grandin 2019, 130; 
also see Emerson 1841)—and animated many other related trends, including consumerism, egoism, 
self-improvement, and settler colonialism (Rand 1964; Taylor 1989; Elliott 2004; Nisbett 2004; 
Henrich 2020). The criticisms we describe below are often offered as correctives against this deep 
cultural tradition. Future research might investigate whether alternative cultural ideologies, such as 
certain indigenous or ecofeminist traditions (Vinyeta, Whyte, and Lynn 2015; Singer 2020), are better 
poised to articulate symbiotic conceptions of the relations between selves, cultures, and structures. 
The form of individualism we focus on is recognizable as a founding ethos of the modern 





It suggests that environmental degradation results from the accumulation of many individuals’ 
wasteful and careless actions. It also implies a solution: individuals can be better stewards of the 
earth, not just by reducing and properly disposing of their waste, but by taking more active personal 
steps, such as recycling, picking up litter, and buying more environmentally friendly products. The 
expanse of garbage in the poster implies that the task might be daunting, but we can solve it by each 
individually taking responsibility for our own local corner of the world.   
Several lines of research commonly framed as individualist investigate ways to promote 
personal stewardship of this kind. One aims to identify drivers of pro-climate action by isolating key 
variables of individuals, such as beliefs about climate change (Leiserowitz et al. 2020), political 
attitudes (Bolsen & Druckman 2018), personality traits (Soutter et al. 2020), and moral frameworks 
(Feinberg & Willer 2013). A complementary literature measures the aggregative effects of the 
personal choices explained by such variables. For example, Wynes and Nicholas (2017) ranked 148 
lifestyle choices to determine which most effectively reduce one’s personal “carbon footprint.” The 
four most impactful things individuals can do according to their analysis (which relies on a notion of 
“impactful” that we interrogate in §4.2) are have one fewer child, live car-free, fly less, and adopt a 
plant-based diet. Research of this kind informs trade nonfiction—books such as The Climate Diet: 50 
Ways to Trim Your Carbon Footprint (Greenberg 2021)—as well as corporate messaging, as seen in blog 
posts such as “9 Things You Can Do to Save the Environment,” which refers to consumption 
habits like eating, water usage, and “fixing” rather than “buying” things (Sunday 2017). A large body 
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of environmental communication research has explored which frames are most effective for 
encouraging individuals to change personal consumption habits like these (e.g., Lorenzoni et al. 
2007; McDonald 2009; Cheng et al. 2011; Gifford and Comeau 2011; Shih & Lin 2017).  
In addition, a set of philosophical questions—also commonly construed as individualist—
focus on whether people are morally obliged to adopt such practices (Sinnott-Armstrong 2005; 
Hourdequin 2010; Broome forthcoming). Other philosophers have examined environmental 
morality through the lens of individual virtues and vices: Jamieson (2007) argues that people should 
cultivate virtues like humility, mindfulness, and temperance in the era of anthropogenic climate 
change, while Hourdequin (2010) raises moral issues related to hypocrisy by considering whether it 
is possible for a person who drives an inefficient car for pleasure to be genuinely concerned about 
climate change. 
Research commonly construed as “structuralist” abstracts away from individuals, or holds 
these individual-difference variables constant, and instead focuses on identifying drivers of climate-
related outcomes exogenous to individuals. These include government type (Harrison & Sundstrom 
2007), industrial arrangements (Mildenberger 2020), policy design and costs (Bechtel & Scheve 
2013), regional wealth (Franzen & Vogl 2013), cues from political elites (Gustafson et al. 2019), 
media tropes (e.g., tropes about national identity; Olausson 2010; Post et al. 2019), and “the 
structural power of business interests” to dominate media coverage and public debate about the 
climate (Wetts 2020; see also Wetts 2019). Scholars of environmental communication have 
highlighted phenomena such as personalization, a common style of reporting that presents climate 
news as a dramatized “game among elites, such as who is winning or losing the debate” (Nisbet 
2009, 18). According to Boykoff and Boykoff (2007): 
 
Instead of concentrating on power, context, and process, the media tend to personalize 
social issues, focusing on the individual claims-makers who are locked in political battle. In 
other words, the macro is foregone in favor of the micro; structural or institutional analyses 
are skipped over in favor of personalized stories that stress the trials and tribulations of 
individuals. Only seldom are these personalized stories linked to deeper social analysis… The 
personalization of the climate-change narrative deflects attention from the roots of the 
problem, favoring the strategic moves of individuals over the political contexts in which they 
operate. (1192, 1197) 
 
Objections to the journalistic norms that prescribe reporting of this type fit into the either/or frame: 
they criticize the overly individualistic focus as coming at the expense of directing attention to more 
important supra-personal structural factors. 
Similarly, structuralist interventions designed to create change are broadly aimed at 
manipulating institutions, understood as the “rules of the road” that shape individuals’ decisions and 
behaviors (North 1991). For example, Trumbo and Shanahan (2000, 200) write, “The conditions 
that brought us climate change, as well as the conditions surrounding future options for dealing with 
it, are embedded in socioeconomic structures and value systems, embracing material advancement 
and fossil fuels—structures and values that are highly resistant to change.” The familiar idea that 
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climate change is an enormous collective action problem whose solution will require binding 
international treaties (e.g., Gardiner 2011) is similarly structuralist in spirit, as are calls for limiting 
population growth or ending global capitalism. Proponents often imply that only proposals like 
these, which address the social structures within which individual agency is exercised, suffice to 
address the relevant challenges. Relatedly, environmental communication scholars have studied 
individuals’ perceptions of the structural obstacles that make it difficult for them to minimize their 
personal carbon footprint, such as the absence of efficient public transportation (e.g., Lorenzoni et 
al. 2007; Whitmarsh et al. 2011; Jarreau et al. 2017). Some invocations of structuralism even include 
explicit dismissals of the individualist ethos, by, for example, pointing out that concepts like 
“litterbug” and “personal carbon footprint” were created by industrial polluters to deflect attention 
and responsibility from themselves. These can be found both in academic research (Parr 2012; 
Webb 2012; Elliot 2016; Stuart et al. 2020) as well as in popular essays whose titles highlight their 
antagonism (as discussed above).  
 
3. Oppositional Thinking 
In this section, we identify four potential causes of oppositional thinking about the 
relationship between individual and structural action. We hypothesize that these causes represent 
some of the psychological roots that make the either/or frame compelling.  
As intuitively compelling as it may be, our concern is that framing individual and structural 
action as in competition with each other—as mutually-exclusive alternatives rather than mutually-
supporting complements—stymies progress in meeting the climate crisis. The prevalence of the 
oppositional framework risks perpetuating false debate, thwarting theoretical collaboration, diffusing 
activists’ energy, and blocking the development of a richer, more synthetic strategic imagination for 
guiding social change.  
A few clarifications and caveats before moving on: we make no ontological claims, and so 
are neither denying the existence of either individuals or social structures nor denying the usefulness 
of the distinction between them in some contexts. Rather than “picking sides,” we support an 
integrative approach, and in §4 develop several ways that crucial structural and individual changes 
are both required to address the climate crisis.  
 
 
3.1 The Duck-Rabbit Problem of Social Behavior 
A helpful metaphor for thinking about the interrelation between individuals and structures is the 





People see either a duck or a rabbit but not both at the same time; bringing one to attention 
inevitably forces the other into the background. But those features of the picture relegated to 
background remain, and remain essential to its composition. While we can only see the duck or the 
rabbit at a single time, the image itself is a product of the relations between all its elements, 
regardless of which ones we attend to.  
Likewise, while different members of the climate community rightly focus on how different 
elements of society affect the climate, we maintain that it is as fruitless to debate the primacy of 
individuals or structures as it is to debate whether the image is really a duck or a rabbit. The most 
effective strategies for change will target both. However, just as it is difficult or impossible to see the 
figure simultaneously as both a rabbit and a duck, we hypothesize that the oppositional framing of 
individuals and structures retains intuitive appeal. 
Thus note that in many cases, a single initiative designed to create social change can be 
plausibly framed as individualist or as structuralist, depending on which features of the initiative are 
emphasized in communication about it. Consider a few concrete cases: 
 
E-Scooters: Italy is awarding 500€ grants to city-dwellers who purchase bicycles or e-scooters. 
These awards can be framed as an individualist reform because they aim to encourage 
individual citizens to reduce their carbon footprint by reducing their personal use of 
automobiles. These awards can also be framed as a structuralist reform because they are 
made possible by a far-reaching nationwide public policy that aims to change the incentives 
that structure individuals’ choices. 
 
Phone banking: You volunteer with an organization to make phone calls to persuade voters in 
your town to vote for political representatives who support a “Green New Deal.” This 
action can be framed as individualist because you are trying to persuade other people to 
change their behavior one-by-one. This action can also be framed as structuralist because it 
is part of a collective action movement seeking to change political behavior (e.g., voting for a 
policy to fundamentally restructure the American economy).  
 
Solar Panels: Choices made by homeowners to install solar panels shape and are shaped by 
their neighbors’ choices (Bollinger & Gillingham 2012). Peer pressure is demonstrably 
powerful (Frank 2020). A county program publicizing local solar installations to increase 
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uptake of residential rooftop solar can be framed as individualist because it targets people as 
consumers. It can also be framed as structuralist because it motivates action by changing 
people’s perceptions of what is common and expected in their social world.  
 
COVID-19: The economic slowdown caused by the coronavirus pandemic created a 
temporary reduction in global emission of approximately 6.4% in 2020 as compared to 2019 
(Tollefson 2021). This was the largest single year drop off in modern history. This temporary 
reduction in global emissions can be framed as vindicating individualism because it 
demonstrates the enormous changes people can make if they choose to alter their behavior. 
It can also be framed as a vindication of structuralism because these individual changes 
resulted from a profound “shock to the system” that was enforced by emergency, top-down, 
state-based policy changes. 
 
Like the duck-rabbit, these examples show how the very same phenomenon can be plausibly 
interpreted as vindicating either individualism or structuralism. It can be difficult to “see” both at 
the same time, just as one can see only the duck or the rabbit at once. We hypothesize that some 
sources for this difficulty include the prevailing conceptual tools for understanding and 
communicating about climate change. 
   
3.2 Overgeneralizing from Specific Outcomes  
Familiar criticisms of individualist approaches to climate change include the ideas that individual 
consumer choices cannot make a material difference to atmospheric GHG concentrations; that 
asking ordinary people to make sacrifices to reduce their carbon footprint unjustly puts the onus on 
victims to solve a problem that they did not create; and that preoccupations with individual action, 
culpability, and purity distract from more effective structural interventions (Boykoff and Boykoff 
2007; Merritt et al. 2010; Hagmann et al. 2019; Heglar 2019; Mann & Brockopp 2019).  
We grant that some individual choices are ineffective for addressing the climate crisis, but 
maintain that the lesson to draw from this is that those specific choices are the wrong ones to make. 
It is a mistake to leap to generalizations about all individual choices, or to conclude that any changes 
to individual behavior are thereby also ineffective. (For discussion, listen to the conversation with 
Shazeen Attari in the inaugural episode of the podcast “A Matter of Degrees,” entitled “Give Up 
Your Climate Guilt” (Stokes & Wilkinson 2020); listen also to Blumberg and Johnson 2021.) If—
and we stress that these are empirical questions—calling for individuals to go vegan and car-free are 
the wrong individual changes to focus on, there must be other individual changes to focus on, 
especially whichever changes best promote needed structural reforms. For example, Whitmarsh et 
al.’s (2011, 56, 59) research on how individuals can become not just “carbon-literate” but “carbon-
capable” highlights a range of actions that individuals can take beyond changing their consumption 
habits, such as “voting for a ‘green’ policy; joining an environmental campaign or community action 
group… lobbying… protesting, [and] creating alternative social infrastructures of provision.” Clearer 
communication about the concrete actions individuals can take to bring about structural reform 
most effectively may be key to combatting climate change. Crucial to this effort will be more fine-
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grained focus on which particular individual actions are valuable in virtue of their relations to 
structural change and how most effectively to communicate this information. Table 1 summarizes 
oppositional and symbiotic thinking about questions like these.   
 
3.3 Cognitive Biases 
The refrain that “structural problems require structural solutions” expresses the thought that 
effective solutions must be as deep, broad, and durable as their corresponding problem. This idea is 
familiar and intuitive, but may stem from misleading biases in causal reasoning and social 
stereotyping. For example, a common source of systematic error in causal reasoning is the belief that 
causes resemble their effects in size and quality (Nisbett & Ross 1980). For example, if told of a 
person who loses their job—a significant consequence—because their computer crashes, people will 
infer a “matching” cause, such as a widespread computer virus. If told of another computer crash 
that yields no significant consequences—no job loss—people will infer a “smaller” cause, such as a 
malfunctioning cooling fan (LeBoueuf & Norton 2012). This “consequence-cause matching” bias 
may lend unearned credibility to the thought that individual action is causally insignificant in 
combatting climate change as well. 
Metaphors of size that often accompany structuralist proposals can imbue them with 
connotations of “big,” inviting other errors in reasoning. It is sometimes implied that what makes an 
intervention “structural” is that it is expected to have a large impact. This renders structuralism 
uninteresting, if not outright empty. That scholars and activists should pursue structural change 
rather than individual change is hardly controversial if structural change is simply defined as that 
which has the biggest impact. Moreover, just as ecofeminists have shown that ideas about gender are 
entwined with ideas about the environment (e.g., Singer 2020), proposals touted as “large-scale,” 
“deep,” or “durable” can seem persuasive because they resonate with entrenched masculinist or 
patriarchal ideology (Roberts et al. 2020). Just like the old advertisement equating meat-eating with 
maleness (“Real Men Eat Beef”), suggestions that that the “real solutions” to climate change are 
structural can seem plausible because they implicitly activate widespread but distorting stereotypes. 
Finally, “big” is vague; it remains unclear what exactly qualifies a policy as big and thereby structural. 
Such vagueness allows interpretive bias to proliferate; are municipal energy-efficiency regulations 
structural? How about such regulations in a smaller town (see, e.g., Cozen et al. 2018)? When 
Walmart switched to LED lightbulbs, was that a structural change? We suspect intuitions about this 
question might be driven by people’s attitudes toward Walmart as much as by their beliefs about 
what makes a change count as structural. Another key empirical question concerns how climate 
communication interacts with such cognitive biases. For example, what are the effects on individual-
level action of describing the structural reforms needed to meet the climate crisis as “big, deep, and 
durable,” and as requiring changes at the level of national laws, international treaties, and billion-
dollar corporations? Such framing may support participation, but it may also undermine it. 
 
3.4 Zero Sum Thinking 
Oppositional thinking presents individuals’ time and resources for addressing climate change as 
zero-sum, as if, for example, recycling comes at the expense of holding extractive industries 
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accountable for pollution. But not all of the choices individuals face are zero-sum. For example, the 
view that efforts to change consumer behavior distract from more important structural changes 
presupposes that the former substitute for the latter. Evidence suggests this may be false, and that 
relationship is sometimes complementary. For example, individuals who reflect on sustainable 
individual behavior become more rather than less likely to support structurally-oriented action, such 
as policy change (Sparkman et al. 2020; see also Geng et al 2019). A plausible hypothesis explaining 
this is that people often want to be consistent across the spheres of their personal activity (Bednar et 
al. 2010). There are many are open empirical questions here, and it remains unclear in what contexts 
“green” consumer behavior complements or substitutes for political behavior in other domains (e.g., 
does going car-free cause people to take fewer or more pro-climate political actions) (Maki et al. 
2019)? But “substitutability” should not be the default assumption, and indeed, lifestyle choices 
sometimes predict taking political action for the climate (Steel 1996; Willis & Schor 2012; Larson et 
al. 2015). 
Given the scarcity of time and energy, the most important question is not whether to pursue 
individual or structural change, but which governmental, economic, and social structures we ought to 
target for change, and what concrete roles individuals can play in efforts to change them. There is, of 
course, extensive research analyzing comparative packages of structural reform. But these packages 
need not be portrayed as somehow representing strategies that are alternatives to those aimed at 
influencing the decisions and behavior of individuals. Rather than presenting these as incompatible 
genres of change, both can be framed together as essential to serious, multifaceted interventions, 
components of coordinated strategies that must be pursued in tandem. All interventions to create 
social change include both individual and structural components, and the individual and structural 
aspects of every intervention are interdependent, as some have long argued (e.g., Boykoff & Boykoff 
2007; Norton 2007; Whitmarsh et al. 2011; Dannenberg et al. 2012; Jaspal et al. 2014; Mitra 216; 
Singer 2020). Consequently, so-called structural reforms always require individual people to support 
and implement them, while individual choices are always shaped by social structures, which 
themselves change when individuals direct their agency towards changing them.  
 
4. Symbiotic Thinking  
 With some of the potential causes of oppositional thinking in view, we turn to the 
constructive task of conceiving individual and structural reforms as mutually reinforcing. Numerous 
lines of research have already made promising inroads. These can be woven together and built upon 
to develop symbiotic approaches for addressing the most pressing questions for the climate 
movement. 
 
4.1 Individual Elements of Structural Change and Structural Elements of Individual Change 
One of the most persistent challenges facing the climate movement is mobilizing voters to support 
pro-climate public policies. Consider carbon taxes, a much-discussed approach to emissions-
reduction often portrayed as structural (though not uncontroversial; Mildenberger & Stokes 2020). 
Carbon taxes aim to slow GHG emissions indirectly by manipulating the basic levers and incentives 
underlying economic activity. In principle, they can work even if almost nobody changes their mind 
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about climate change or makes an intentional decision to reduce their carbon footprint. Rather, 
traditional economic reasoning predicts that emissions will decline simply because the price of 
producing them increases. 
 But passing carbon taxes is politically challenging (Rabe 2018). Debate over them activates 
partisanship, identity processes, and economic anxiety. Persuading the public to support taxing 
carbon requires contending with the ways in which individual citizens think about the issues 
involved. Research in this vein should continue exploring the political psychology relevant to the 
distributional challenges carbon taxes create (Klenert et al. 2018; Raymond 2019; Gaikwad et al. ms). 
Questions such as the following are central: should all citizens receive equal carbon dividends, or 
should those most impacted by climate change receive the most? Should the money be spent on 
climate change mitigation? Environmental communication research has demonstrated the greater 
efficacy of “motivational” or “gain” frames relative to “sacrifice” or “loss” frames (Gifford & 
Comeau 2011; Scannell & Gifford 2013). How much, if at all, should messaging be framed in terms 
of sacrifice, especially if being upfront about costs could mitigate backlash once a policy is 
implemented (Campbell & Kay 2014)? Answering these questions and overcoming the obstacles to 
passing carbon taxes requires a both/and approach: evaluating an ostensibly structural reform—the 
tax-and-dividend scheme—in a paradigmatically individualist way by considering how people think 
and feel about equity and desert, especially in light of their political and social identities. 
A similar lesson holds for those advocating for putatively individualist reforms; they can take 
a both/and approach by thinking of individuals in paradigmatically structuralist ways (Schmitt et al. 
2020). The difficulty of persuading individual citizens and political elites to support carbon taxes 
illustrates this point. Carbon taxes have failed when fossil fuel companies and other opponents have 
funded massive lobbying and disinformation campaigns about them (Mildenberger 2020). These 
campaigns act as structural forces shaping how individuals—both voters and politicians—think 
about the relevant policies. Lobbying that changes the attitudes of individual citizens thereby 
changes the incentive structures that shape the behavior of politicians, thus shifting the structural 
context in which politicians operate. In that newly induced context, resisting carbon taxes can help 
them win re-election, while endorsing carbon taxes can lead donors to fund a rival candidate, etc. A 
both/and approach that conceives of individuals as structurally situated would focus attention on 
ways to change the incentives that shape voters’ and politicians’ attitudes toward policies like a 
carbon tax. 
The example of changing incentivizes illustrates how thinking of individuals in structuralist 
terms requires a shift from generic, untargeted efforts to persuade via unadorned appeals to 
scientific evidence or moral argument—efforts to make “objective” arguments that “should” 
persuade everybody, but target nobody in particular. Instead, decades of research in environmental 
communication have explored how attempts to motivate individuals should attend to the specific 
roles they occupy, and to the constraints and incentives they face in light of their organizational 
position (e.g., Krupar & Krupar 1989; Lorenzoni et al. 2007; Nisbet 2009; Cheng et al. 2011; Gifford 
& Comeau 2011; Scannell & Gifford 2013; Goodwin & Dahlstrom 2014; Jaspal et al. 2014; Mitra 
2016; Hopke 2017; Jarreau et al. 2017; Shi & Lin 2017; Kelly 2019; Akin et al. 2020).  For example, 
efforts to persuade CEOs, elected officials, and other institutional leaders to support pro-climate 
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policies should attend to the particular constraints and incentives faced by each, which, in turn, 
depend on stakeholders, consumers, constituents, and so on (see §4.5; Henderson 2020). 
More generally, changes in social institutions and structures reliably lead to changes in 
people’s minds. Individuals’ voting and consumer choices are shaped by social forces that make the 
available options attractive or distasteful, easy or difficult, efficient or inefficient, etc. Thus, while it 
is true that enacting a structurally-oriented reform like a carbon tax requires thinking in an 
individualist way, it is equally true that persuading individuals to support the right reforms requires 
thinking of their options in a structuralist way. Research on how corporations, laws, media 
organizations, culture, and communication shape the architectures of choice for individuals is thus 
crucial to building better symbiotic approaches to decarbonization.  
 
4.2 Social Signaling and Social Norms 
A second pressing question facing the climate movement has to do with effectively disseminating 
information in ways that motivate action. While a strong majority of Americans believe in the 
science of climate change, too few understand the consequences of unabated warming (Leiserowitz 
et al. 2020). Likewise, political representatives tend to be both uninformed about their constituents’ 
beliefs about climate change (Hertel-Fernandez et al. 2019) and skeptical that those beliefs translate 
into tangible action or influence voting behavior (Willis 2018). Better information dissemination is 
needed. 
 As has long been appreciated in environmental communication (e.g., Antilla 2005; Nisbet 
2009; Nisbet & Kotcher, 2009; Scannell & Gifford 2013; Jarreau et al. 2017; Hopke 2017), social 
norms likely have a key role to play here. Norms are the often-unwritten rules that govern social life 
(Sripada & Stich 2007; Chudek & Heinrich 2011; Gelfand 2018; Kelly & Setman 2020). They are 
both “in the head” of individuals and are also elements of social structures. On the one hand, 
individuals’ decisions are shaped by the norms they internalize from their community. On the other, 
the social norms prevalent in a community are kept in place by collectively shared expectations and 
common practices. These rules are not explicit policies or formal institutions, but are better 
conceived as informal institutions or “soft structures” (Davidson & Kelly 2020) that provide 
information about what other people do and what other people think one ought to do (Bicchieri 
2016; Tankard & Paluck 2016). Social norms can be leveraged to disseminate climate-related 
information in durable and motivationally effective ways. 
Consider whether to go car-free. One way to evaluate the impact of this choice is to estimate 
its reduction on one’s personal carbon footprint (2.4 tons of CO2-equivalent emissions per person 
per year (Wynes & Nicholas 2017)). But one might also take into account the signals one sends—i.e., 
the messages one communicates to others—by walking, bicycling, and telling one’s friends, family, 
and co-workers about this choice. This all helps create a different set of social expectations in one’s 
community. Individual choices have material externalities, but they also perform measurable 
signaling functions, changing perceptions of what is normal and appropriate. Individual actions can 
communicate genuine values to elite decision-makers as well as other citizens. Governments and 
businesses may resist change so long as they perceive people to be merely talking about a crisis but 
going about their business as usual (Hackel & Sparkman 2018). 
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Taking this research program further requires addressing a series of empirical questions 
about the interaction of individuals and social structures. These questions include how much 
“broadcasting” power different individuals have, which in turn requires exploring individual 
differences in geographic location (city residents who may not drive versus suburban residents who 
do). A given person’s social location is also key, as prestigious individuals, for example, have 
disproportionate power to frame and define how others interpret a given issue (Antilla 2005) and 
thereby transmit normative information about appropriate responds to it (Henrich & Gil-White 
2001; Nisbet and Kotcher 2009). They can serve, in other words, as “social referents,” people from 
whom others take their cues (Paluck et al. 2016). Visible sacrifices made by these individuals will 
likely have larger effects on others than “easy” choices (Hackel & Sparkman 2018). Indeed, highly 
visible individuals who publicly advocate for structural change risk being perceived as hypocritical if 
their own personal choices do not also reflect commitment to pro-climate values (Sparkman & 
Attari 2020). 
 
4.3 Ease-Impact Tradeoff 
A third pressing question is how researchers should think and communicate about the comparative 
“bang for the buck” of more structurally-oriented interventions compared to more individually-
oriented interventions.  We propose a rule of thumb for this challenge, which we call the “Ease-
Impact Tradeoff:” all else equal, easier-to-implement reforms are likely to have less impact, whereas 
harder-to-implement reforms are likely to have more. For example, buying carbon offsets is easy but 
unlikely to change the course of global events; an enforceable international treaty to curb emissions 
would be tremendously influential, but is dauntingly complex and likely to be met with opposition. 
This is a general heuristic, and so not without exceptions. Still, it speaks to the goal of striking a 
good balance of effort invested to expected outcome. The worst interventions will be those that 
drain attention and resources while making a negligible difference, while the best will be those that 
are both achievable and impactful. 
Taking the Ease-Impact Tradeoff seriously, especially in the context of tailoring messages 
for various audiences in climate change communication, requires attending to key variables that 
reflect the intertwined character of individual and structural reform. The following questions can 
help refine these efforts: 
 
Feasibility: what is possible for individuals who occupy different social positions to do given 
current political, economic, and cultural constraints (Nielsen et al. 2020; Schmitt et al. 2020)? 
How demanding is a given intervention of the relevant individuals, given the “choice set” of 
their social environment? Meanwhile, which public policies and legal frameworks are leaders 
emboldened to reform, given the opinion and mood of the electorate at a specific point in 
time, the expected role of interest groups, and so on?  
 
Advisability: what is the potential for an individual pro-climate choice to “catch on” with 
others rather than decrease the likelihood that they act similarly, particularly in politicized 
cultures where climate-related behavior signals partisan identity? Similarly in the domain of 
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public policy, what are the chances for long term durability rather than backfire or further 
politicization? Will the intervention risk unintended consequences? How dangerous might 
those consequences be?  
 
Knowability: how predictable are the effects of pro-climate individual choices and social-
structural policy-changes? For example, what key variables determine when consumer 
choices reach tipping points that render them collectively consequential for reducing system-
wide decarbonization (Otto et al. 2020)? Similarly, have proposed decarbonization policies 
been tried before under similar institutional, political, and cultural circumstances? If so, are 
the results generalizable? 
 
Answering such questions about any specific intervention demands symbiotic thinking. Framing 
inquiry in these terms can supplant debate about prioritizing individual or structural change.  
 
4.4 Initiating Roles and Sustaining Roles 
Fourth, how can the climate community more effectively let people know what they can do, as 
individuals, to help fight climate change? Oppositional thinking risks creating a motivational morass 
if individualist-oriented advice—flying less often, eating less meat—is seen as doable but ineffective, 
while structuralist-oriented advice—creating “structural reform” or “changing the system”—is seen 
as vague, unachievable, or overwhelming. A symbiotic alternative is to direct individuals to the 
variety of social roles they can play to create and sustain structural change (Scheufele et al. 2004; 
Norton 2007; Whitmarsh et al. 2011; Hestres & Hopke 2020; also see Zheng 2018, Laurence 2020).  
A distinction between two broad families of social roles provides another useful heuristic for 
symbiotic thinking. Individuals can take up initiating roles which may be easily available to them 
based on their social positions. Scientists, for example, can help initiate change by gathering data 
relevant to assessing interventions (they can also choose between various initiating roles, such as 
being a pure scientist, science arbiter, issue advocate, or honest broker (Pielke 2007)); corporate 
leaders and employees can initiate change by talking about and seizing opportunities to tie 
innovation to decarbonization; lawmakers can initiate change by articulating reasons in favor of their 
preferred policies; columnists and pundits can disseminate and contextualize those plans and the 
research on which it stands; organizers and activist groups can mobilize support for them; 
marketers, advertisers, and artists can make them appealing; citizens need to vote for them. 
Likewise, a variety of sustaining roles are available to individuals who want to help protect and 
entrench progress already made. These take up the tasks of ensuring the long-term efficacy of short-
term gains, which in turn can become self-reinforcing as policy changes stimulate changes in beliefs 
and norms (Kinzig et al. 2013). Sustaining roles involve guiding the social policies and laws through 
the “fog of enactment” (Stokes 2020), explaining their benefits to the public in honest and personal 
ways (e.g., Goodwin & Dahlstrom 2014; Broockman & Kalla 2016), and building lasting support for 
them. One challenge here is that some programs (e.g., vaccination) can work “too well,” giving the 
impression they are ineffective or unnecessary. Public perception can go awry in other ways, too. 
President Obama’s TARP bailout was instrumental in growing today’s wind and solar industry. 
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However, this is not well-known because one unsuccessful piece of this program—the Solyndra 
grant—received outsized attention (Brady 2014). Individuals can fill sustaining roles by working to 
prevent this kind of misperception and backsliding. For example, executives in renewable energy 
companies benefiting from federal support can speak publicly about the social and economic returns 
of that government investment, and employees can pressure their executives to do so. Increased 
support for public investment can in turn shape the costs and incentives surrounding renewable 
energy, nurturing positive feedback loops of pro-climate action and policy, and building upon a self-
reinforcing cycle of change recently dubbed the “green vortex” (Meyer 2021). 
 
4.5 Salience 
Finally, how can researchers continue to increase the salience of climate change for voters, and 
perhaps create a formidable demographic of “single-issue” climate voters who will put pressure on 
policy makers and others poised to enact structural change? Relatedly, what can researchers do to 
disrupt the “issue-attention cycle” described by environmental communication researchers (Downs 
1972; Trumbo 1996; McDonald 2009) that structures the waxing and waning of public interest in 
climate change?  
Climate researchers can draw inspiration from the symbiotic strategies used by activists 
focused on other issues. For example, important lessons can be learned from the National Rifle 
Association (NRA), who have had success even though there is overwhelming bipartisan support in 
the United States for restrictions on gun ownership. For example, 93% of Democrats and 82% of 
Republicans favor mandatory background checks for private gun sales and gun shows (Schaeffer 
2019). Nevertheless, the NRA has helped block the passing of any federal law that requires such 
background checks. What the NRA has done, with nearly unrivaled success, is cultivate “a distinct, 
politicized gun owner social identity over the course of many years, which enables it to influence 
politics by mobilizing its supporters into frequent and intense political action on its behalf” 
(Lacombe 2019, 1342). This creates a striking amount of issue salience for these voters. 71% of 
Americans who favor less strict gun laws are unwilling to ever vote for political candidates who 
support gun control; in contrast, among those who favor stricter laws, only 34% refuse to vote for 
candidates who do not share their gun preferences (Aronow & Miller 2016). For political 
representatives who occupy positions of structural power, this kind of issue salience translates to 
reliable votes. The NRA created a constituency by promulgating a gun culture and a social identity for 
individuals to take up, and then gradually but strategically leveraged the reliable voting habits of 
those individuals into ties to political elites and leaders of the Republican Party (Han & Barnett-Loo 
2018). How to create social identities and leverage identity-based thinking to effectively pressure 
politicians—how to bridge the “value-action gap” on climate change—remains a key strand of 
research in environmental communication (Fox & Frye 2010; Dannenberg et al. 2012; Jaspal et al. 
2014; Akin et al. 2020; Hestres & Hopke 2020).  
This strategy of “outside lobbying”—in which an interest group influences politics by 
motivating mass organized behavior—exemplifies symbiotic thinking about social change. By 
creating and then appealing to a specific identity, the organization aims to recruit and motivate 
individuals to act collectively in virtue of their shared beliefs, values, and positions within a set of 
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social structures. Indeed, recent research suggests that this strategy, pace the kind of zero-sum 
thinking discussed in §3.4, can create positive “spillover effects,” wherein engaging in one kind of 
pro-environmental behavior can increase the likelihood that they will also engage in other kinds 
(Geng et al 2019). More generally, by leveraging reliable blocks of votes into policy prerogatives, 
outside lobbyists can achieve structural change by harvesting and directing the power of cumulative 
individual actions (Skocpol 2013). 
Transposing this both/and strategy to climate change will not be without challenges (Kurz et 
al. 2020), though it should be broadly replicable. Indeed, activists and researchers are hard at work in 
outside lobbying for climate action. Research guided by symbiotic thinking can continue raising the 
salience of climate change for members of different social groups, as well as helping to build a 
common identity uniting them. The climate community can also continue advertising the variety of 
social roles available to individuals within movement activism; the geographies in which individuals 
are more and less likely to confederate around shared identity (e.g., churches and college campuses); 
the temporality of identity-mobilization (e.g., before vs. after an extreme weather event); and so on.  
 
5. Conclusion 
We have argued that what starts as a useful heuristic—individual vs. structural change—is 
often framed as a zero-sum choice between two opposed ways of making change. We identified four 
causes of oppositional thinking about individual and structural change and proposed five ways of 
thinking and acting symbiotically instead. We have described how symbiotic thinking can facilitate 
social change and climate action, identifying roles for individuals based on their position within 
social structures and strategies for evaluating the potential impact of their choices. 
Future research in environmental communication can build upon these ideas to examine the 
pragmatic and discursive effects of messages about how individual and structural change relate to 
each other. We have suggested that the trope of oppositional contrasts between individual and 
structural reform may undermine climate activism, but this is an empirical question demanding 
further study. Similarly, we showed how many climate interventions can be framed in either 
individual or structural terms (§3.1) and how public discussion of these interventions may be 
distorted by social stereotypes about, for example, gender (§3.3). Likewise, while researchers have 
studied the most effective messages for encouraging individuals to change their consumption habits, 
a further set of empirical questions regarding the “spillover” effects of these effective messages—for 
example, on motivating pro-climate political action—are paramount. 
Symbiotic thinking keeps firmly in mind that social structures shape the choices and 
behavior of individual people, while those choices and behavior (re)shape the social structures 
within which people live. It acknowledges that some individual actions are more influential than 
others, just as some structurally-oriented policy changes are more advisable than others. But it insists 
that the way to identify the most promising combinations is by pursuing research and activism that 






Topic Structuralist Claim Individualist 
Claim 
Interdependence 
Causal Insignificance Individual consumer 
choices cannot make a 
material difference to 
atmospheric GHG 
concentrations. Only 
changes to “hard” 
structures such as laws 
and material 
infrastructures can have 
the requisite causal 
impacts.  
  





to change them 
causally 
insignificant. In 





do what they 





causally depend on 
individual changes, and 
vice versa. Therefore, if 
consumption choices like 
plant-based diets and 
recycling are insignificant, 
there are other changes 
individuals must make to 
transform climate 
structures. The causal 
impacts of individual 
choices and structural 
reforms must be assessed 
empirically, including 
consideration of 
investments of effort 
against expected 
outcomes. See §4.3.  
Breadth, Depth, 
Durability 
Rather than focus on 
idiosyncratic issues (e.g., 
meat consumption), 
“deeper” and lasting 
change is needed which 
addresses the “root” or 
“underlying” causes of 
the climate crisis (e.g., 
economies reliant on 
fossil fuel extraction and 











in the United 
States). 
Deep and durable change 
is needed, but because of 
the potential for “failed 
success” of structural 
reform—i.e., changes that 
create backlash sufficient 
to undo them (e.g., 
Prohibition in the United 
States)—structural 
change must ensure 
popular support.  
Victim Blaming Ordinary people—
especially the global 
poor—suffer the worst 
effects of climate 
change. Asking them to 
make sacrifices to reduce 
their carbon footprint 
unjustly puts the onus 
on the victims to solve a 
problem that they did 
not create. 











electric cars and 
electrification 
Holding individuals 
responsible for helping to 
solve collective problems 
need not entail blaming 
them (Anderson 2010; 
Zheng 2018). Individuals 
have responsibilities to 
others given their 
distinctive social roles 
(e.g., citizens must vote, 
businessowners must 
decarbonize their 




Distraction Preoccupation with 
individual (consumer) 
choice distracts from 
more effective activities 
like climate activism 
(Frank 2020). 
“Greenwashing” has 
been effective for 
diverting attention from 
corporate malfeasance to 
consumer-based “green” 
identity signaling 













The crucial empirical 
question is in when 
“green” consumer 
behavior complements or 
substitutes for 
structurally-oriented 
behavior. Identity and 
consistency effects may 
drive “green consumers” 
to be more rather than 
less likely to engage in 
climate activism (§3.2).   
Meta-Structuralist 
Belief 
Belief systems are 
consequences of 
structural phenomena. 
People subscribe to 
individualist worldviews 
because they live in 
societies organized 
around individual liberty, 
and the pursuit of 
personal wealth and 
happiness. Inequality 
increase people’s beliefs 
in individual 
responsibility for one’s 
fate (García-Sánchez et 
















Widely held beliefs both 
cause and are caused by 
structural phenomena. 
For example, CO2 
removal technologies like 
carbon capture and 
storage are likely 
necessary for reaching 
global net-zero emissions. 
Public support for CO2 
removal technologies is 
weak in part because they 
are seen as “too slow” 
and as failings to address 
“root causes.” (Cox et al. 
2020)  
Corporate and State 
Responsibility 
100 companies are 
responsible for 
producing 70% of global 
GHGs since 1988 
(Griffin 2017). The 
worst offenders have 
known for decades that 
their product would 
create the climate crisis; 
their response was to 
fund misinformation 




are run by 
individuals, 







government behavior is 
constrained by “hard” 
structures, such as law 
and public policy, as well 
as “soft” structures, such 
as social norms, e.g., 
mandating a narrow 
commitment to lobbyists 
and stakeholders’ 
financial interests (§4.2). 
Changing corporate and 
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science (Oreskes & 
Conway 2010). They 
must be held 
accountable by 
legislative enaction of 
pro-climate laws and 
policy.  
state behavior requires 
changing these hard and 
soft structures of 
incentives and 
constraints, which 
requires, in turn, action 
by other institutionally-
empowered individuals 
(e.g., media elites, “social 
referents,” community 
leaders, norm 
entrepreneurs, and the 
ordinary people who 
must organize to hold 
empowered individuals 
accountable (§4.2, 4.4; 
Raymond et al. 2013; 
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